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Social media companies make extensive use of artificial intelligence in their efforts to 
remove and block terrorist content from their platforms. This article begins by arguing that, 
since such efforts amount to an attempt to channel human conduct, they should be regarded 
as a form of regulation that is subject to rule of law principles. The article then discusses 
three sets of rule of law issues. The first set concerns enforceability. Here the article 
highlights the displacement effects that have resulted from the automated removal and 
blocking of terrorist content and argues that regard must be had to the whole social media 
ecology, as well as to jihadist groups other than the so-called Islamic State and other forms of 
violent extremism. Since rule by law is only a necessary, and not a sufficient, condition for 
compliance with rule of law values, the article then goes on to examine two further sets of 
issues: the clarity with which social media companies define terrorist content and the 
adequacy of the processes by which a user may appeal against an account suspension or the 
blocking or removal of content. The article concludes by identifying a range of research 
questions that emerge from the discussion and that together form a promising and timely 
research agenda to which legal scholarship has much to contribute. 
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In January 2018, in a speech to the World Economic Forum, Prime Minister Theresa May 
declared that technology companies need “to move further and faster in reducing the time it 
takes to remove terrorist content online”, adding that ultimately such content should be 
“removed automatically” (May 2018). The following month the UK Home Office announced 
that it had developed a new tool that – by analysing the audio and images of a video file 
during the uploading process – could detect and reject 94% of propaganda of the so-called 
Islamic State (IS) with a 99.99% success rate. The tool would be made available to all 
internet platforms (Greenfield 2018). 
 
The terms of service of the leading social media companies stipulate that terrorist content is 
forbidden. For example, Facebook’s Community Standards state that organisations that are 
engaged in terrorist activity are not allowed a presence on the platform. The use of Facebook 
to facilitate or organise criminal activity that causes physical harm or financial damage to 
people or businesses is also prohibited, as is threatening physical harm to individuals and 
celebrating a crime that one has committed. The Twitter Rules forbid the use of the service 
for any unlawful purposes or in furtherance of illegal activities. This includes threatening or 
promoting terrorism, as well as affiliation with organisations that use or promote violence 
against civilians to further their causes. And YouTube’s Community Guidelines state that 
terrorist organisations may not use the platform for any purpose, including recruitment. 
Content related to terrorism, such as content that promotes terrorist acts, incites violence or 
celebrates terrorist attacks, is also prohibited. 
 
Given both the sheer volume of online content (every minute 350,000 tweets are posted,
1
 300 
hours of video are uploaded to YouTube
2
 and on Facebook 510,000 comments are posted, 
293,000 statuses are updated and 136,000 photos are uploaded
3
) and the variety of conduct 
that may be removed (from sexual exploitation and hate speech to spam and bullying), it is 
unsurprising that each of these platforms already utilises artificial intelligence (AI) to assist in 
the enforcement of their rules and standards (in addition to referrals from users, law 
enforcement and governments, which are responsible for only a small minority of 
suspensions and take-downs (Bickert & Fishman 2018; Twitter 2017; Wojcikci, 2017)). 
Facebook’s use of AI includes image matching (so that, if someone tries to upload a photo or 
video that matches a photo or video that has previously been identified as terrorist, they are 
prevented from doing so), language understanding (analysing text that has been removed for 
praising or supporting terrorist organisations in order to develop text-based signals that can 
go into machine learning algorithms to detect similar future posts), removing terrorist clusters 
(using algorithms to work outwards from pages, groups, posts or profiles that have been 
identified as supporting terrorism, employing signals such as whether an account is friends 
with a high number of accounts that have been disabled for terrorism) and tackling recidivism 
(detecting new accounts created by repeat offenders) (Bickert & Fishman 2017). Twitter also 
uses algorithms to identify accounts that may be violating its rules (Twitter 2016), such that 
from 1 August 2015 to 31 December 2017 a total of 1,210,357 accounts were suspended for 
                                                 
1
 ‘Twitter Usage Statistics’ http://www.internetlivestats.com/twitter-statistics/ (last visited 10 April 2018). 
2
 ‘37 Mind Blowing YouTube Facts, Figures and Statistics – 2018’ https://fortunelords.com/youtube-statistics/ 
(last visited 10 April 2018). 
3
 ‘The Top 20 Valuable Facebook Statistics – Updated April 2018’ https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-
facebook-statistics/ (last visited 10 April 2018). 
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the promotion of terrorism (Twitter 2018a) - a stark contrast to 2013-14, when Twitter’s 
account suggestion algorithm
4
 was having the effect of connecting individuals at risk of 
radicalisation with extremist propagandists (Berger 2013). Meanwhile, from June to 
December 2017 YouTube removed over 150,000 videos for violent extremism, with 98% of 
these flagged by machine-learning algorithms. Nearly 70% were taken down within eight 
hours of upload (and nearly half within two hours) (Wojcicki 2017). In November 2017, 
YouTube also drastically reduced its video archive of the jihadist preacher Anwar al-Awlaki. 
Although some of this content did not violate YouTube’s Community Guidelines, the 
decision was made that al-Awlaki should be treated similarly to a terrorist organisation with 
an outright ban (Shane 2017). Prior to the ban a search for “Anwar al-Awlaki” returned over 
70,000 videos. Now it returns fewer than 20,000, and these are overwhelmingly news reports 
about his life and death, debates over the legality of his killing and refutations of his work by 
scholars or other material about him. Video fingerprinting technology is being used by 
YouTube to flag videos of al-Awlaki automatically before anyone sees them (Shane 2017). 
 
Each of the measures identified in the previous paragraph were taken by one social media 
company acting independently. This meant that terrorists could “jump from platform to 
platform” (Bickert & Fishman 2017), reposting content that had been removed from one 
platform on a different one or posting on multiple platforms in the first place. In an effort to 
address this, in December 2016 Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Microsoft announced the 
creation of a shared industry database of hashes (i.e. unique digital fingerprints) for content 
produced by or in support of terrorist organisations (Facebook 2016). These hashes allow 
member companies to identify and remove matching content that violates their policies – and 
sometimes block such content before it is even posted. As of June 2018, the database 
contained more than 88,000 hashes and nine further companies had joined the consortium 
(including Ask.fm, Cloudinary, Instagram, Justpaste.it, LinkedIn, Oath and Snap) (GIFCT 
2018). 
 
The various methods that have been outlined share a common goal: to remove terrorist 
content as swiftly as possible or, ideally, to prevent it from appearing in the first place.
5
 They 
are thus examples of what Hildebrandt (2008) labels “constitutive”, as opposed to 
“regulative”, interventions (174). Facebook’s Community Standards, the Twitter Rules and 
YouTube’s Community Guidelines each seek to engage users’ “moral register” (Brownsword 
2011, 1328). The former two emphasise the importance of users feeling safe when using the 
platforms, whilst the latter emphasises that respect for the guidelines ensures that the 
platform is “fun and enjoyable for everyone”. This moral reasoning is supplemented with 
warnings that users may report – or flag – content that it is felt violate the relevant policies. 
These warnings appeal to a user’s “prudential register” (Brownsword 2011, 1329): they seek 
to deter the posting of inappropriate content by appealing to the user’s own interests. What 
moral and prudential signals have in common is that they are normative: they say that X 
ought, or ought not, to be done. By contrast, the uses of AI by social media companies 
outlined above, and encouraged by the UK Government, are non-normative. By seeking to 
prevent terrorist content from ever reaching their platforms, the signal to users is “you cannot 
do this; you really cannot do this” (Brownsword 2015, 6, emphasis original). 
 
                                                 
4
 Detailed at https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/account-suggestions (last visited 10 April 2018). 
5
 AI has also been used to divert individuals searching for Islamic State propaganda online away from such 
content. The ‘Redirect Method’, created by Google’s think tank Jigsaw, uses the targeting tools of Google’s 
advertising service Adwords to redirect such individuals to curated YouTube videos that aim to discredit and 
debunk the content that the individual searched for (Jigsaw 2017). 
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This article examines social media companies’ use of AI to block terrorist content, against the 
backdrop of the wider societal shift towards constitutive, non-normative regulation. Building 
on recent scholarship – in particular the work of Roger Brownsword (2011; 2015; 2016), that 
argues that forms of non-normative regulation should be regarded as both within the province 
of legal scholarship and subject to rule of law principles – the article focuses on three sets of 
issues: the challenges presented by the displacement effect of blocking terrorist content on 
the biggest social media platforms; the clarity with which social media companies define 
terrorist content; and, the adequacy of the processes by which a user may appeal against an 
account suspension or the blocking or removal of content. Before turning to these issues, the 
article first explains why the use of non-normative regulatory instruments by private 
technology companies should be regarded as being subject to the rule of law. 
 
Two caveats should be highlighted at the outset. First, for reasons of space, the article focuses 
on three platforms: Facebook; Twitter; and, YouTube. As will become clear, this should not 
be taken as indicating that other platforms are not also important. Second, the article’s focus 
on three sets of issues related to the rule of law should not be taken as indicating that there 
are not also other important issues that merit further examination. In particular, the accuracy 
and false positive rates of the AI that identifies and blocks terrorist content warrant closer 
scrutiny. 
 
Automation, terrorist content and the rule of law 
 
At first, the deployment of AI to block terrorist content from social media platforms seems 
some way removed from discussions of the rule of law, in two respects: the mode of 
regulation and the responsible actors. Starting with the latter, the rule of law is traditionally 
associated with public institutions, not private technology companies. Yet in the current 
context a steadfast public-private distinction is difficult to maintain. The importance of 
public-private partnership in responding to terrorists’ use of the internet is widely recognised 
(Kavanagh et al 2017). In addition to take-down requests issued by government agencies, 
there are a number of multi-stakeholder initiatives at both the national level (including the 
technology developed by the UK Home Office mentioned earlier) and the international level 
(including the EU Internet Forum, which brings together governments, Europol and 
technology companies, and Tech Against Terrorism, a project that supports technology 
companies (particularly start-ups and small companies) that is mandated by the United 
Nations Counter Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (UN CTED) and implemented 
by the ICT for Peace Foundation). More fundamentally, states have a responsibility to protect 
national security. As Lord Hope stated in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department, “It 
is the first responsibility of government in a democratic society to protect and safeguard the 
lives of its citizens.”6 At the same time, Lord Hope continued, the rights and liberties of 
individuals must be respected. Indeed, as the UK’s CONTEST strategy emphasises, respect 
for human rights and the rule of law is in itself an important component of an effective 
counterterrorism strategy (HM Government 2018). It is important, therefore, that the policies 
and practices that technology companies adopt to counter terrorist activities also reflect this 
commitment to human rights and the rule of law. 
 
In terms of the mode of regulation, the rule of law would traditionally be associated with 
governance by rules, such as those prescribed in statute and expounded in case law. However, 
“From the fact that law is conceived of as a normative phenomenon, it does not follow that 
                                                 
6
 [2004] UKHL 56, [99]. 
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the ambit of jurisprudence should be limited to legal norms” (Brownsword 2015, 10). As 
Brownsword has argued, to limit the ambit of jurisprudence to legal norms would be to 
exclude other kinds of normative order that are found in society (such as religious and moral 
codes) and which have an important influence on “what makes things tick in the social world 
[and] how legal norms fit into the full array of normative signals” (Brownsword 2015, 12). 
Equally, it would be mistaken to limit the domain of jurisprudence to the exclusively 
normative: 
 
“To give ourselves the chance of understanding and assessing a radical transformation 
in the way that the State channels human conduct, we need to work with a notion of 
the regulatory environment that includes both normative and non-normative 
instruments … For jurists to turn away from the use of technological instruments for 
regulatory purposes is to diminish the significance of their inquiries and to ignore 
important questions about the way that power is exercised and social order 
maintained” (Brownsword 2015, 13-14) 
 
A “regulatory environment” should thus be understood “as an action-guiding environment in 
which regulators direct the conduct of regulatees with a view to achieving a particular 
regulatory objective” (Brownsword 2011, 1327).  
 
What makes the use of AI to prevent terrorist content from reaching social media platforms 
appealing is its greater effectiveness in comparison to the moral and prudential signals found 
in these companies’ terms of service. At the same time, however, it is important that this 
“brute instrumentalism […] is conditioned by principles that give it legitimacy” 
(Brownsword 2016, 138). So, regardless of the different regulatory form, rule of law 
principles are of continuing relevance: 
 
“On the one side, it remains important that governance – now in the form of power 
exercised through technological management – is properly authorised and limited; 
and, on the other, although citizens might have less opportunity for ‘non-compliance’, 
it is important that the constraints imposed by technological management are 
respected” (Brownsword 2016, 106-7). 
 
In short, “it is the ideal of legality together with the Rule of Law that stands between us and a 
disempowering techno-managed future” (Brownsword 2016, 138). 
 
Imperfect impossibility and tactical displacement 
 
The study of the population of IS supporters on Twitter conducted by Berger and Morgan 
(2015) found that, during October and November 2014, there were no fewer than 46,000 
overt IS supporter accounts on Twitter – and possibly as many as 90,000. The average 
number of followers of these accounts was 1004, and each account posted an average of 7.3 
tweets per day over its lifetime. Since this “Golden Age” (Conway et al 2017, 28), IS’s 
presence on Twitter has been reduced significantly. Towards the end of 2014 Twitter began 
an aggressive campaign of suspensions. Berger and Morgan (2015) found that, by February 
2015, IS supporters on Twitter were having to devote far more time to rebuilding their 
networks (as opposed to disseminating propaganda, recruiting and other activities). A follow-
up study conducted by Berger and Perez (2016) also found that suspension activity had a 
significant disruptive effect. Individual users who repeatedly created new accounts after 
being suspended “suffered devastating reductions in their follower counts” and declines in 
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networks persisted even when suspension pressure eased, “suggesting that suspensions 
diminish activity in ways that extend beyond the simple removal of accounts” (4). Those IS 
supporters who persisted in their use of the platform resorted to the use of countermeasures, 
such as locking their accounts so that they were no longer publicly accessible, using an 
innocuous image or the default egg as the avatar image and selecting a random combination 
of letters and numbers as the user handle or screen name. But since “A conscious, supportive 
and influential virtual community is almost impossible to maintain in the face of the loss of 
access to such group or ideological symbols and the resultant breakdown in commitment”, 
today IS’s Twitter activity “has largely been reduced to tactical use of throwaway accounts 
for distributing links to pro-IS content on other platforms, rather than as a space for public IS 
support and influencing activity” (Conway et al 2017, 30) – and these throwaway accounts 
are also suspended before they gain much of a following (Grinnell, Macdonald & Mair 2017; 
Grinnell, Macdonald, Mair & Lorenzo-Dus 2018). 
 
Whilst considerable progress has been made in disrupting the use of Twitter by IS supporters, 
Conway et al (2017) found that supporters of other jihadist groups – such as Hay’at Tahrir al-
Sham (HTS), Ahrar al-Sham, the Taliban and al-Shabaab – experienced significantly less 
disruption. Whilst more than 30 percent of pro-IS accounts were suspended within 48 hours 
of their creation, the equivalent figure for these other pro-jihadist accounts was less than one 
percent.
7
 The latter were also able to post six times as many tweets, follow four times as 





The criminological literature on situational crime prevention highlights the fact that no pre-
emptive scheme is perfect (Rosenthal 2011). As Rich (2013) observes, “Though the goal of 
an impossibility structure is to make the commission of a crime practically impossible, the 
reality is that the ingenuity of potential criminals is inexhaustible” (823). One technique that 
has been used by IS supporters is out-linking, i.e., the use of Twitter as a “gateway” 
(O’Callaghan et al 2013, 276) to other websites, social media platforms and content hosting 
sites. In Conway et al’s (2017) study, 7,216 (12.5 percent) of the 57,574 tweets analysed 
contained out-links. The platform with the most out-links from Twitter was YouTube. 
Interestingly, however, Facebook did not appear in the top ten, whilst the less-known 
justpaste.it, sendvid.com and archive.org all featured in the top six.
9
 The use of these smaller 
platforms appears to be an attempt to “exploit an overlapping ecosystem of services”, taking 
advantage of the fact that smaller companies “don’t have the scale or resources to handle the 
challenge on their own” (Tech Against Terrorism 2017). Justpaste.it, for example, is a free 
content-sharing service that allows content to be posted within seconds with no registration 
required. Owned by Mariusz Zurawek, who runs the site out of his home in Poland, the 
content posted on Justpaste.it began to include IS propaganda in early 2014. By March 2015, 
Zurawek estimated that he had removed up to 2,000 posts at the request of London 
Metropolitan Police (Stalinsky & Sosnow 2016). Since then he has received a large volume 
of take-down requests from all over the world. This poses challenges in terms of identifying 
what content is legal and responding to take-down requests in other languages, as well as 
capacity and resources (Tech Against Terrorism 2017). 
                                                 
7
 Similarly, 85 percent of pro-IS accounts were suspended within the first 60 days of their life; the equivalent 
figure for the other pro-jihadist accounts was 40 percent. 
8
 A further challenge is the removal of historical content. Facebook has reported that, in the first quarter of 2018, 
its “historically focused technology found content that had been on Facebook for a median time of 970 days” 
(Bickert and Fishman 2018). 
9
 The other two platforms in the top six were Google Drive and Google Photos. 
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Impossibility structures may also lead to “tactical displacement” (Rich 2013, 824). Besides 
the use of throwaway Twitter accounts out-linking to propaganda hosted on other platforms, 
IS supporters have largely moved their community-building activities to other platforms, in 
particular Telegram. Telegram is a cloud-based instant messaging service, providing optional 
end-to-end encrypted messaging. Features include: a self-destruct timer that permanently 
deletes messages and media after they are viewed; group chats, which users can only join 
when invited to do so; and, channels, which are public and so can be used to broadcast 
messages to large audiences. As IS’s presence on Twitter diminished, a migration to 
Telegram occurred. By early 2016, Telegram was being used to share content produced by 
official IS channels, and IS members and supporters were pushing out more than 30,000 
Telegram messages each week (Prucha 2016). Telegram chat-rooms and channels also 
possess psychologically addictive qualities, which aids efforts to build virtual communities as 
well as the promotion of so-called self-starter terrorism (Bloom, Tiflati & Horgan 2017). 
These uses of Telegram form part of a wider movement towards the use of more covert 
methods (United Nations Security Council 2017). As well as Telegram, other encrypted 
messaging services, including WhatsApp, have been used by jihadists for communication and 
attack-planning (Malik 2018). Websites have also been relocated to the Darknet: the day after 
the 2015 Paris attacks, for example, IS’s media division Al-Hayat Media Center launched a 
new website on the Darknet to host its propaganda, including a video celebrating the attacks 
(Ragan 2015). Darknet platforms are, by definition, more difficult to police than the surface 
and deep webs, meaning they have the potential to function as a jihadist “virtual safe-haven” 
(Malik 2018, iv).  
 
An important aspect of the rule of law is enforcement: rule by law is a necessary condition for 
the rule of law (Spigelman 2003). What the examples discussed in this section illustrate is 
that, if the aim of blocking terrorist content online is to be realised, regard must be had to the 
whole social media “ecology” (Conway et al 2017, 32). This involves broadening the focus 
beyond just the biggest social media companies. It has been reported that, in 2016, the UK’s 
Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit reported content across 300 different services (Tech 
Against Terrorism 2017). The platforms offered by smaller companies are also susceptible to 
exploitation, and the challenges and barriers to these companies self-regulating may be quite 
different to the social media giants. Meanwhile calls, such as those from the UK’s Home 
Secretary, for “backdoors” to be built into encrypted messaging services also raise complex 
issues around privacy and security (in the sense of both protection against terrorism and 
protection against the backdoor being exploited) (Haynes 2017). Similarly, it is necessary to 
broaden the focus beyond IS, not just to other jihadist groups but also to other forms of 
violent extremism. Extreme right-wing groups, for example, also have a significant online 
presence (O’Callaghan et al 2013). And, whilst steps have been taken to disrupt their 
presence on the surface and deep webs (e.g. Facebook’s decision to ban Britain First from its 
platform (Nouri 2018)), these groups also appear to be migrating to the Darknet (Deep Dot 
Web 2017). 
 
Non-normativity and definitional clarity 
 
For scholars of counterterrorism legislation and policy, the potential for tension to exist 
between rule by law and rule of law will be familiar. There is a significant body of literature 
that examines the analogous notion that security and liberty should be balanced, and in 
particular the suggestion that – if the (perceived) threat of terrorism increases – some 
measure of liberty should be sacrificed for the sake of enhanced security (Macdonald 2009a; 
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Macdonald 2009b; Posner 2006; Posner & Vermeule 2007; Waldron 2003; Zedner 2005). 
Importantly, it has been pointed out that security and liberty are interdependent: whilst 
security may in some sense be regarded as a prerequisite for the enjoyment of liberties, in 
another sense the protection of liberties is necessary to ensure security (against the power of 
the state) (Barak 2002). Moreover, as noted above, it is widely acknowledged that respect for 
human rights is an important component of an effective counterterrorism strategy. So, whilst 
regulators must have regard to the whole social media ecology in order to realise the 
objective of blocking terrorist content online, ensuring rule by law is only a necessary, and 
not a sufficient, condition for compliance with rule of law values. In this section and the one 
that follows we accordingly examine two issues – the clarity with which social media 
companies define terrorist content and the adequacy of the processes by which a user may 
appeal against an account suspension or the blocking or removal of content – that engage 
these wider rule of law values. 
 
The challenges involved in defining “terrorism”, and the lack of an internationally agreed-
upon definition, are well-documented (see, e.g., Hardy & Williams 2011; Saul 2006). 
Summed up by the slogan ‘One person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter’, perhaps the 
most controversial definitional issue is that of just cause. In his report on the UK’s statutory 
definition of terrorism, the then Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation Lord Carlile 
recognised the initial attractiveness of a just cause exception but concluded that it would 
create “real difficulties” (Carlile 2007, 44). Not only is there “far from total international or 
domestic agreement as to which regimes are/are not in breach of international humanitarian 
law” (Carlile 2007, 44), but “Those who opt for terror always believe their cause is just” 
(Fletcher 2006, 906). According to Hodgson and Tadros (2013), this results in a trilemma: 
 
“Horn 1:  Define terrorism narrowly to exclude from the definition all attacks on the 
state and its officials. In doing so terrorism law will not be suitable for the purposes 
that we have for it. Horn 2:  Define terrorism broadly to include all attacks on the state 
and its officials. In that case terrorism law will in principle, and probably in practice, 
apply to legitimate freedom fighters. Horn 3:  Define terrorism in a way that 
discriminates between legitimate and illegitimate attacks on the state and its officials. 
This involves a range of legal actors making political judgments that they have 
inadequate expertise to make” (496) 
 
This issue arose for consideration in R v F.
10
 In this case, the Court of Appeal upheld the 
conviction for terrorism offences of a Libyan man who was found in possession of 
information on explosives and notes on how to overthrow Colonel Gaddafi. He had fled to 
the UK in 2002, and been granted asylum in 2003, after members of his family and friends 
had allegedly been killed by Gaddafi’s regime. Delivering the judgment of the Court, Sir Igor 
Judge P stated: “the legislation does not exempt, nor make an exception, nor create a defence 
for, nor exculpate what some would describe as terrorism in a just cause … Terrorism is 
terrorism, whatever the motives of the perpetrators” ([27]). Commenting on the judgment, 
Hodgson and Tadros argue that it amounts to a recognition that “the law must apply to all 
such cases because the court cannot adequately discriminate between legitimate and 
illegitimate uses of violence, acknowledging that there may be cases where this leads to 
serious injustice” (517).  
 
                                                 
10
 [2007] EWCA Crim 243. 
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The issue was revisited in R v Gul,
11
 in which the Supreme Court was asked to determine 
whether the UK’s definition of terrorism contains an exception for military attacks by a non-
state group against the armed forces of a state in the course of a non-international armed 
conflict. Whilst the definitions of some other countries do contain such an exemption, the 
Supreme Court held that the “natural, very wide” wording of the UK’s definition could not be 
read down so as to contain one ([38]). UK law is thus “impaled” on the second horn of 
Hodgson and Tadros’ trilemma (2013, 517).  
 
Even without a just cause exception, a pro-democracy activist may be undeterred: the 
paradigmatic example is Nelson Mandela. Yet one of the concerns that commentators have 
expressed about technological management is that it “might compromise the possibility of 
engaging in responsible moral citizenship” (Brownsword 2015, 36; see also Rosenthal 2011). 
Morozov (2013) explains: 
 
“Laws that are enforced by appealing to our moral or prudential registers leave just 
enough space for friction; friction breeds tension, tension creates conflict, and conflict 
produces change. In contrast, when laws are enforced through the technological 
register, there’s little space for friction and tension – and quite likely for change” (36). 
 
The movement towards non-normative regulation could thus have significant repercussions 
for activists living in oppressive regimes. Gerbaudo’s (2012) analysis of the role played by 
internet communication and social media in contemporary activism argues that, against the 
backdrop of a crisis of public space, “social media have become emotional conduits for 
reconstructing a sense of togetherness among a spatially dispersed constituency, so as to 
facilitate its physical coming together in public space” (159). An example is the Facebook 
page “We Are All Khaled Said” (KKS), which promoted the protests that led to the 
overthrow of the Mubarak regime in the Egyptian revolution of 2011 (Alaimo 2015). 
Gerbaudo (2012) explains that the KKS page was used to build a community of activists in a 
“Choreography of Assembly” (12). Choreographing consists of “the mediated ‘scene-setting’ 
and ‘scripting’ of people’s physical assembling in public space” (40) and in this particular 
instance included the use of “feeder marches” (64) advertised on the KKS Facebook page and 
the advance publication of an online booklet explaining to people how they should behave 
during the protests. 
 
However, the growing use of AI and increasing government pressure to block terrorist 
content means that today social media companies’ “policies and the architecture of their 
products will increasingly complicate collective action efforts” (Youmans and York 2012, 
325-6). A stark example is the removal from YouTube of thousands of videos documenting 
atrocities in Syria, following the introduction of new technology to automatically remove 
content that potentially breached YouTube’s Community Guidelines (Browne 2017). These 
videos provided important evidence of human rights violations and some existed only on 
YouTube, since not all Syrian activists and media can afford an offline archive. The channel 
of the monitoring group Violation Documentation Center (VDC) – which housed over 32,000 
videos of the conflict – was also taken down, although VDC was later able to regain access to 
its channel and videos (Kayyali and Althaibani 2017). 
 
The Syria example demonstrates the importance of human review. Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube each have processes by which users may appeal decisions to remove content. They 
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 [2013] UKSC 64. 
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also recognise that AI cannot always deduce “what supports terrorism and what does not … 
and algorithms are not yet as good as people when it comes to understanding this kind of 
content” (Bickert & Fishman 2017). But whilst a discretionary “safety valve” (Roth 2016, 
1287) may be both unavoidable and necessary, it is also important to be mindful of rule of 
law values. This is evident in discussions of the UK’s statutory definition of terrorism. On the 
one hand, concerns have been expressed about the definition’s (over-) breadth (Anderson 
2014); on the other hand, the UK Government has highlighted the “complexity and fluidity of 
changing political events in the terrorism context and its ability to evolve and diversify at 
great speed” – which, it is argued, means that a “flexible statutory framework” is required in 
order to “ensure that our law enforcement and intelligence agencies can continue to disrupt 
and prosecute those who pose a threat to the public” (HM Government 2015, 8). 
Commenting on this, the Supreme Court in R v Gul stated: 
 
“The Crown's reliance on prosecutorial discretion is intrinsically unattractive, as it 
amounts to saying that the legislature, whose primary duty is to make the law, and to 
do so in public, has in effect delegated to an appointee of the executive, albeit a 
respected and independent lawyer, the decision whether an activity should be treated 
as criminal for the purposes of prosecution … Further, such a device leaves citizens 
unclear as to whether or not their actions or projected actions are liable to be treated 
by the prosecution authorities as effectively innocent or criminal—in this case 
seriously criminal” ([36]). 
 
Whilst there may be obvious differences between drafting legislation that criminalises 
particular conduct and terms of service that specify when content may be removed from 
social media platforms, the concerns identified by the Supreme Court remain relevant. 
Publicly defining what will be deemed to constitute terrorist content restricts and guides the 
discretion of individual reviewers, reducing the risk of inconsistent – or even inappropriate – 
decision-making. And even if there are already internal procedures or policies
12
 – or other, 
extra-legal factors (such as institutional culture or practice) – that already limit how reviewers 
exercise this discretion in practice,
13
 defining terrorism in the terms of service serves an 
important communicative function. It provides users with information needed to understand 
their rights and responsibilities when using the platform (Citron 2018). Here the “principle of 
maximum certainty” (Horder 2016, 85) is important; a definition that is unduly vague or 
ambiguous will not enable users to make informed decisions about their use of the platform, 
and also leaves open the possibility of “censorship creep” (Citron 2018, 1050). 
 
At present, YouTube’s Community Guidelines state that the platform does not permit 
“terrorist organisations to use YouTube for any purpose” and “strictly prohibits content 
related to terrorism”, but without defining the terms “terrorist organisation” and “terrorism”. 
In terms of Hodgson and Tadros’ trilemma, this leaves it uncertain which of the three 
approaches the company takes and – on the assumption that it does not seek to block content 
related to a just cause – leaves it unclear how it adjudicates which causes are just. By 
contrast, Facebook’s Community Standards define a terrorist act as “a premeditated act of 
                                                 
12
 The distinction between decision rules (addressed to officials) and conduct rules (addressed to the public) was 
discussed by Dan-Cohen (1984), who argued that the selective transmission of the former can in some 
circumstances be compatible with the rule of law. Even if selective transmission (in the sense used by Dan-
Cohen) could be justified in the current context – and we are sceptical as to whether it could be – there remain 
important rule of law concerns about the conduct rules (the terms of service), as we explain above. 
13
 It has been reported that some companies use international, regional or national sanctions lists to guide their 
decision-making on this issue (ICT for Peace & Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate 2016). 
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violence against persons or property carried out by a non-government actor to intimidate a 
civilian population, government or international organisation in order to achieve a political, 
religious or ideological aim”, whilst the Twitter Rules offer the following definition (of 
violent extremism): 
 
“We consider violent extremist groups to be those which meet all of the below 
criteria: 
 identify through their stated purpose, publications, or actions, as an extremist 
group 
 have engaged in, or currently engage in, violence (and/or the promotion of 
violence) as a means to further their cause 
 target civilians in their acts (and/or promotion) of violence 
Exceptions will be considered for groups that have reformed or are currently engaging 
in a peaceful resolution process, as well as groups with representatives elected to 
public office through democratic elections. This policy does not apply to military or 
government entities” 
 
These two definitions share some similarities and, as a result, raise some common issues, 
such as whether the reference to “violence” is both too broad (it is not limited to serious 
violence) and too narrow (it would apparently not encompass a cyberterrorist attack that 
caused serious economic or environmental harm).
14
 There are also several dissimilarities. 
Only Facebook’s definition stipulates that the violence must have been premeditated, whilst 
only Twitter’s definition raises the possibility of exceptions for groups that have reformed, 
are engaged in a peace process or have democratically elected representatives (though the 
discretion it retains in this regard is left undefined). Like the definitions of many national 
legislatures (Hardy and Williams 2011), Facebook’s definition contains an intention 
requirement (“… to intimidate a civilian population, government or international organisation 
…” and a motive requirement (“… political, religious or ideological aim”), whilst Twitter’s 
definition instead asks whether the group identifies “as an extremist group”. The latter seems 
inadequate to meet the demands of the principle of maximum certainty, given the possibility 
of articulating more precise intention and motive requirements. Lastly, Twitter’s definition 
requires that the violence that was employed or promoted targeted civilians, whereas 
Facebook’s definition contains no such limitation.15 The Twitter Rules thus take the first of 
Hodgson and Tadros’ three approaches – excluding from its definition attacks on the state 
and its officials, with the concomitant risk of under-inclusivity – whereas, on the face of it, 
Facebook, like the UK Government, take the second approach, with no express exception 
made for just causes – leading, therefore, to either over-inclusivity and unfairness or the 
exercise of an unarticulated discretion. 
 
It is also noteworthy that, for the purposes of the shared industry database of hashes, the 
companies have stated that the database will only contain hashes “of the most extreme and 
egregious terrorist images and videos” (Facebook 2016). This not only leaves terrorism 
undefined, which is significant given the companies’ differing approaches outlined above, it 
also adds another layer of ambiguity since “what constitutes extreme and egregious terrorist 
content is unclear” (Citron 2018, 1053).  
                                                 
14
 These issues were considered by the UK Government during the consultation process that resulted in the 
existing definition in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (Home Office 1998). 
15
 An intention to intimidate a civilian population will suffice for the intention requirement in Facebook’s 




Concocting a satisfactory definition of terrorism has been likened to the quest for the Holy 
Grail (Levitt 1986). Whilst social media companies cannot be expected to achieve the 
impossible, the rule of law requires that they explain to their users what content will be 
deemed terrorist and blocked as clearly as they are able. Looking to the existing definitions of 
national legislatures may provide some assistance, although many of these definitions have 
also been criticised on rule of law grounds (Hardy and Williams 2011). Citron (2018) 
accordingly argues that, in the first instance, a multi-stakeholder group that includes both 
academics and human rights groups should be established to help the companies articulate 
more clearly what constitutes terrorist material, whilst in an open letter to Facebook Chief 
Executive Office Mark Zuckerberg, the current United Nations Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering 
terrorism has recommended that Facebook adopt the model definition of terrorism devised by 
her predecessor (Ní Aoláin 2018). 
 
Prior restraint and technological due process 
 
Machines work with data and code; they do not attribute meaning (Hildebrandt 2018). 
Inevitably, therefore, the algorithms that identify and block terrorist content cannot be 
expected to operate with 100 percent accuracy. Accordingly, Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube each offer an appeals process. Facebook’s appeal process has three steps: first, the 
user will receive a notification and be given the option to request additional review; a human 
reviewer will then conduct the review, hopefully within 24 hours; finally, if a mistake has 
been made, the user will be notified and the content restored (Bickert 2018). In April 2018, 
Facebook announced that for the first time it was giving users the opportunity to appeal 
decisions to remove individual posts, photos or videos that had been deemed to violate its 
Community Standards; prior to this, users had only been able to appeal against the removal of 
a profile or page (Bickert 2018). Twitter’s most severe enforcement action is permanent 
account suspension. In this situation the user may appeal through the platform interface or by 
filing a report, outlining the reasons why they believe they did not violate the Twitter Rules. 
If the suspension is deemed to be valid, the user will receive information on the policy that 
the account violated (Twitter 2018b). Whilst YouTube reserves the right to terminate an 
account for a single case of severe abuse (such as predatory behaviour), for most violations of 
its Community Guidelines it operates a three-strike policy. A user may appeal against both an 
account termination and the issuance of a strike. When a strike is issued, the user receives an 
email and an alert in their channel settings. A strike remains in place for a period of three 
months. A strike may only be appealed once, and if the appeal is unsuccessful the user will 
not be able to appeal a different strike for 60 days. If the appeal is successful, the strike will 
be removed, and the video will normally be restored.
16
 Three strikes within a three-month 
period results in account termination (YouTube 2018). 
 
The increasing resort to automated decision-making has led to concerns being expressed 
about “technological due process” (Citron 2008). One specific issue in the current context is 
the impartiality of the human reviewers considering appeals against account suspension or 
the blocking/removal of content who may, for example, be inclined to defer to their 
company’s language understanding algorithms. An additional concern is whether sufficient 
information is available to users who wish to lodge an appeal. This is all the more important 
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The first type of information regards the AI that detects and blocks violating content. This 
resonates with wider calls for “algorithmic transparency” (Chandler 2017, 1024). Pasquale 
(2015) uses the analogy of a black box – that is, “a system whose workings are mysterious; 
we can observe its inputs and outputs, but we cannot tell how one becomes the other” (3) – 
and suggests that agencies “ought to be able to ‘look under the hood’ of highly advanced 
technologies like … algorithms” (165) as a way to police such behaviour. This is all the more 
important since “‘black box’ processes, because of their mechanical appearance and 
apparently simple output, have a veneer of objectivity and certainty” (Roth 2016, 1269-
1270). However, these calls for transparency face a number of difficulties. There may be 
commercial and proprietary objections to disclosure. There may also be concern that the 
information will be exploited: “The process for deciding which tax returns to audit, or whom 
to pull aside for secondary security screening at the airport, may need to be partly opaque to 
prevent tax cheats or terrorists from gaming the system” (Kroll et al 2017, 639). And, perhaps 
most fundamentally, “machine learning tends to create models that are so complex that … 
even the original programmers of the algorithm have little idea exactly how or why the 
generated model creates accurate predictions” (Rich 2016, 886; see also Desai & Kroll 
2017).
18
 Kroll et al (2017) explain: 
 
[I]nspecting source code is a very limited way of predicting how a computer program 
will behave. Machine learning, one increasingly popular approach to automated 
decision making, is particularly ill-suited to source code analysis because it involves 
situations where the decisional rule itself emerges automatically from the specific data 
under analysis, sometimes in ways that no human can explain. In this case, source 
code alone teaches a reviewer very little, since the code only exposes the machine 
learning method used and not the data-driven decision rule” (638) 
 
Moreover, whilst techniques do exist that offer some form of reason-giving, these do not 
provide reasons for individualised predictions but instead operate on an algorithm-wide scale, 
describing how important an input variable was to the algorithm’s accuracy during training 
across many individuals (Lehr & Ohm 2017). 
 
Much of the wider literature about algorithmic transparency refers to the use of AI to 
generate future predictions, such as a person’s creditworthiness (Citron & Pasquale 2014) or 
the risk of criminality (Joh 2016). In the current context, by contrast, AI is being used to 
detect violations of the platforms’ terms of service. Here, understanding how the alleged 
violation was detected is less important to the user wishing to lodge an appeal than 
understanding what violation is alleged to have occurred. This takes us back to the 
importance of the principle of maximum certainty; definitional clarity not only provides users 
with fair warning before they post content, it also provides them with the information needed 
to have an effective opportunity to challenge alleged violations. For example, a pro-
democracy activist who wishes to challenge the removal of content may be hampered if they 
have no indication whether, and how, the platform distinguishes between just and unjust 
causes. Similarly, the Twitter Rules forbid “promoting terrorism”. This leaves it unclear 
whether the fact that content would be understood by others as promoting terrorism is 
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 Yildirim v Turkey, application no. 3111/10, 18 December 2012; Near v Minnesota 283 US 697. 
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 It has been reported, for example, that Google engineers do not fully understand RankBrain (Schwartz 2016). 
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sufficient to justify removing it, or whether the promotion of terrorism must also have been 
the user’s purpose (Macdonald and Lorenzo-Dus forthcoming).19 There is also a further 
danger here: in rule of law terms, congruence. Examinations of terrorism-related precursor 
offences have shown that there is a discrepancy within these offences between the offence 
definition and the wrong that is being targeted (Edwards 2010; Tadros 2007). As a result of 
these offences’ overly broad wording, which encompasses conduct that is not being targeted 
for prosecution, only some of those who fall within the offence definition will be prosecuted. 
Yet at trial the factors that led to the defendant being selected for prosecution will not be in 
issue; the question will instead be whether the requirements set out in the offence definition 
are satisfied. The effect is to deprive the trial court of the opportunity to adjudicate on the 
actions that the offence is targeting (Macdonald 2014). By analogy, if the wording of social 
media platforms’ terms of service encompasses significantly more content than is in fact 
selected for removal, and as a result does not reflect the factors that cause the AI to 
block/remove content, then the effect will be to deprive human reviewers – whose task is to 
apply the terms of service – of the opportunity to adjudicate on the factors underlying the 
automated decision. Some form of reason-giving, of the type mentioned at the end of the 
previous paragraph, would go some way towards addressing this problem. 
 
As well as the provision of sufficient information, an additional concern is the possibility of 
bias. Whilst describing an algorithm as biased might seem to perpetuate the “homunculus 
fallacy” – “the belief that there is a little person inside the program who is making it work – 
who has good intentions or bad intentions, and who makes the program do good or bad 
things” (Balkin 2017, 1223) – it is important to recognise that “automated systems are not 
free of bias simply because they are executed by logical machines” (Chandler 2017, 1045). 
There are a number of reasons why an algorithm might impact different groups of individuals 
disparately, such as disadvantageous definition of the outcome variables and non-
representative data collection (Lehr and Ohm 2017). For this reason, it is important to 
examine the actual outcomes of algorithmic decision-making (Chandler 2017; Kim 2017). 
This is particularly important in the current context, given that claims of anti-Muslim 
prejudice are utilised by jihadist radicalisers who deploy an us versus them discourse to Other 
the West (Lorenzo-Dus and Macdonald 2018). Indeed, a study of IS Twitter activity found 
that suspension played an important role in community-building, with the majority of the 
accounts studied referring to Twitter’s use of suspension as a specific tool to persecute 
Muslims (Pearson 2017). Examples included the tweets: “There has been a major Twitter 
purge targeting Muslims” and “I got #Radicalised when me and my people started to get 
suspended on every social media platform”. This is not to suggest that the suspension of these 
accounts was not in accordance with the Twitter Rules; rather, it is to underline how 
important it is that the AI is equally effective at blocking and removing violating content 




This article began by arguing that social media companies’ efforts to use AI to block terrorist 
content should be subject to the rule of law. The ensuing discussion highlighted the relevance 
of a number of rule of law principles, including maximum certainty, congruence, non-
discrimination and enforceability, and in the process raised a variety of questions that 
together form a promising and timely research agenda. These questions include: How should 
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terrorism (Grinnell, Macdonald & Mair 2017). 
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smaller technology companies be encouraged to protect their platforms against exploitation 
and supported in this task? How can the challenges presented by encrypted messaging 
services be addressed, whilst respecting the privacy of individual users? When defining 
terrorism, which of the definitional approaches should social media companies take? Should 
they create an express exemption for those with a just cause? If so, how should they seek to 
differentiate between just and unjust causes? Could – and should – more information be 
provided to users as to the factors that cause the AI to block content? Could the wording of 
terms of service more closely reflect these factors? And, is the AI equally effective in 
identifying content from different forms of violent extremism and, if not, how can the 
perception of discrimination be mitigated? 
 
This article has taken a first step in developing answers to some of these questions, but much 
further work remains to be done. Our overarching objective has been to show not just the 
societal importance of these questions as part of national and international efforts to counter 
contemporary terrorism, but also to demonstrate that these questions fall squarely within the 
expertise of legal scholars. As such, legal scholarship has much to contribute to both these 
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